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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

POLYGLYCOAT CORPORATION,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
vs.
STEVEN HOLCOMB, dba
STEVE HOLCOMB DISTRIBUTING,

No. 15779

Defendant-Appellant.

NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action brought by the plaintiff to
collect on an account for goods sold; and a counterclaim
by the defendant-appellant for damages resulting from the
breach of a distributorship contract.
DISPOSITION BELOW
Immediately prior to the commencement of the trial,
the trial court granted plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment
on its

claim which was unopposed by the defendant-appellant.

Following a two and one-half day trial on the defendant's
Counterclaim to a jury, the Hon. Bryant H. Croft, one of
the judges of the Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake
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County, granted a judgment of directed verdict in favor
of plaintiff-respondent on

~efendant-appellant's

Counter-

claim for breach of a distributorship contract.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendant-appellant seeks a reversal of the trial
court's judgment of directed verdict, and an order remanding
the case for a trial on defendant-appellant's claim for
breach of contract.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
In the spring of 1975 as a distributor of various
automobile products, defendant-appellan't was approached by
the plaintiff-respondent and was offered an exclusive
distributorship for Polyglycoat products (R.P. 496).
Defendant-appellant accepted the offer, and the parties
came to an oral agreement that defendant-appellant would
distribute Polyglycoat products in the states of Utah,
Colorado, New Mexico, Nevada and Arizona (R.P. 497).

The

products to be distributed were Polyglycoat, a sealer-wax
type substance that was applied to automobiles to allegedly
enhance and protect the paint finish (R.P. 553).

In

addition, Polyglycoat carried a maintenance product that
was used on the car to maintain the original finish following the initial treatment with the sealant-wax product.

2
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Subsequent to his being made a distributor, defendantappellant hired salesmen and established sub-distributors
to market the product and establish permanent customers
(R.P. 565,566,587).

Following efforts by the defendant-

appellant as a distributor Polyglycoat began to gain in
popularity and defendant-appellant desired that the oral
distributorship agieementbe incorporated into a writing.

On February 7, 1976, the parties entered into a written
agreement setting out minimum purchase requirements,
territory, and duration (Exhibit 3-D).

The contract was

silent as to payment terms and standards of performance
(Exhibit 3-D).
In the course of business dealings between the
parties, defendant-appellant would order Polyglycoat on a
per case basis, with a case consisting of two quart cans
of Polyglycoat sealant and twelve maintenance kits (one
kit per car)(R.P. 497).

The case was designed to service

twelve automobiles with an initial treatment of product
from the quart cans.
care in the future.

~aintenance

kits were used for their

In addition, a card warranting the

life of the finish was included (Exhibit 8-D).

Plaintiff-

respondent found that this packaging design had to be
changed as the two quart cans of sealant proved to be too
much product for twelve cars (R.P. 525).

As such, each

3
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distributor was told to remove a quart can from each case
(R.P. 525, Exhibit 6-B).

Still, this did not remedy the

excess, and the distributors were told to remove the other
quart can, replacing it with a small tube (R.P. 526).
After following plaintiff-respondent's directions and
removing the cans from the cases, defendant-appellant was
faced with a surplus of Polyglycoat product for which he
had already been billed (R.P

597, Exhibit 1-D).

As the

sole distributor of Polyglycoat in the area of Utah,
Colorado, New Mexico, Nevada and Arizona, defendant-appellant
decided to utilize the excess product by marketing it
through a service center-detail shop, and through the
customers that he had already established (R.P. 753).

To

facilitate such, defendant-appellant had bottles manufactured
in which he was going to market the excess product (Exhibit
18-P).

In addition, the defendant-appellant had warranty

cards printed (Exhibit 11-P).
needed for two reasons: (1)

The warranty cards were
Defendant-appellant was short

of warranty cards for the maintenance kits as dealers would
fill them out under the name of a prospective new car buyer,
if

ani

the sale subsequently fell through the card was wasted,

leaving the dealer with one card short for every such
occurrence.

Defendant-appellant had requested replacements

from the plaintiff-respondent, to no avail (R.P. 592, 593);

4
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(2)

As the distributor and the representative of Polyglycoat,

defendant-appellant wanted to warrant any product sold, including the excess product.

At the time the warranty cards

were completed defendant-appellant had spoken with his
accountant who advised against their use (R.P. 633).

After

reflection and outside advice, defendant-appellant abandoned
any plan to use the bottles, and never marketed any product
in them as he realized for the first time to do so might
be unethical or unfair (R.P. 591, 592, 753).

Prior to

abandoning the above plan, defendant-appellant had never
received any written instruction on how to dispose of the
excess Polyglycoat product, and as the distributor for
Utah, Colorado, New Mexico,

Nevada and Arizona, he felt

his responsibility and authority was to sell and distribute
Polyglycoat products in a manner using his best judgment
(R.P. 530).
Defendant-appellant continued to perform under
the distributorship contract, and had ordered the required
product for the first quarter of the agreement term, which
plaintiff-respondent refused to ship (Exhibit 9-D).
Plaintiff-respondent established another
distributor who has

utilized many of the same customers

and sub-distributors that the defendant-appellant established
(R.P. 675).
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ARGUMENT
I.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT'S
MOTION FOR A DIRECTED VERDICT WHERE THERE WAS SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE OF DEFENDANT-APPELLANT'S GOOD FAITH
In the case below, the trial court granted a

directed verdict against defendant-appellant on the basis
that defendant-appellant failed to exercise good faith in
entering into and performing the contract of February 7,
1976.

Since good faith is a subjective test and because

there was abundant evidence that defendant-appellant acted
in good faith, the trial court erred in directing the
verdict.
The issue of good faith under the UCC is a subjective test.

In Balone v. Cadillac Automobile Co., 113

N.H. 108, 303 A.2d 194 (1973) the Supreme Court of New
Hampshire discussed the issue of good faith by applying
it to the circumstances of a purchaser.
By its terms this is a subjective standard
of good faith, that is whether the particular purchaser believed he was in good faith,
not whether anyone else would have held the
same belief. The test is what the particular ~erson did or thought in the given
situation and whether or not he was honest
in what he did. (emphasis added)
See Farmers Cooperative Elevator, Inc. v. State Bank, 236
N.W.2d 674 (Iowa 1975); Tumber v. Automation Design & Mf8.
Corp., 130 N.J. Super. 5, 324 A.2d 602 (1974); Eldon's
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Super Fresh Stores, Inc. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner

& Smith, Inc., 296 Minn. 130, 207 N.W.2d 282 (1973).
In determining the issue of good faith, therefore, it is critical to know whether defendant-appellant was
honest in what he did.

There was credible evidence at

trial which if believed, would have demonstrated that defendant-appellant acted in good faith.

The evidence showed that

although defendant-appellant had a large supply of excess
product that had to be disposed of, he did not have enough
warranties for the product.

Defendant-appellant had

requested additional warranties from plaintiff-respondent,
but they were never sent.

In deciding what to do with

the excess product and lack of warranties, defendantappellant considered selling the excess product in his own
'~~

bott~es
~-

and printing the

wa:~antie~_him~ing

this

---------~-----------

he would be able to get rid of his excess product and also
have warranties for those bottles and also for others.
In pursuit of this plan, defendant-appellant had
some bottles manufactured and some warranties printed.
However, before the plan was ever put into effect, defendantappellant spoke with his accountant, who advised him that
the plan would possibly not be a good business practice.
After receiving this advice, and deliberately considering
the plan, defendant-appellant decided not to pursue the

7
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idea.

At that point nothing more was done.
At the time the idea was conceived, defendant-

appellant honestly believed

that he would not be sacrific-

ing his performance under the contract.

When he made a

more careful consideration and had a feeling that the plan
was not ethically proper, he immediately abandoned it.

From

this evidence presented at trial it was apparent that what
defendant-appellant thought and did was honest and therefore
in good faith.
In addition to being a subjective matter, the
issue of good faith is particularly a jury issue.

In Walter

E. Heller & Co., Inc. v. Convalescent Home, 49 Ill.App. 3d
213, 265 N.E.2d 1285 (1977) the Illinois Appellate Court
stated that
the test of good faith is a subjective
standard to be determined by the facts
of each case. Consequently, the defense
of lack of good faith by plaintiff
presents a factual issue which cannot be
resolved purely as a matter of law . . .
The Court of Appeals of Kentucky in Fort Knox
National Bank v. Gustafson, 385 S.W.2d 196 (1964), construed
the UCC provision on good faith as "requiring the submission
to the jury of the issue of good faith unless the evidence
relating to it is no more than a scintilla, or lacks
probative value having fitness to induce conviction in the
minds of reasonable men."
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As previously discussed, there was considerable
evidence presented at trial, far more than a scintilla, on
the issue of defendant-appellant's good faith.

Because

there was contradictory evidence on the issue of good faith
and since good faith is a jury issue, the trial court erred
in not allowing the good faith issue to go to the jury.
From the evidence presented at trial it is clear
that the trial court did the very opposite of what this
Court declared in Finlayson v. Brady, 121 Utah 204, 240
P.2d 491 (1952).
In directing a verdict, this court has
held, as the authorities generally hold,
that the evidence is to be examined in
a light most favorable to the party
against whom the verdict is intended, and
that it is not the province of the court
to weigh or determine the preponderance
of the evidence.
Also,

Anderso~

v. Gribble, 30Utah 2d 68, 513 P.2d 432 (1973);

Smith v. Thornton, 23 Utah 2d 110, 485 P.2d 870 (1969).
Had the trial court viewed the evidence as instructed by this Court in Brady, a directed verdict would
never have been granted against defendant-appellant.

By

granting a directed verdict against defendant-appellant,
the trial court violated this Court's declared policy
"to zealously protect the right of trial by jury and not to
take issues from them and rule as a matter of law except

9
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in clear cases."

See Webb v. Olin Mathieson Chemical Corp.,

9 Utah 2d 275,342 P.2d 1094 (1959).
This was definitely not a clear case.

The

evidence was such that reasonable men could and would have
arrived at different conclusions.

See Rhiness v. Dansie,

24 Utah 2d 375,472 P.2d 428 (1970).

The directed verdict

must therefore be reversed.
II.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT'S
PROCEDURAL REQUESTS WHICH PREJUDICED THE DEFENDANTAPPELLANT IN PREPARING HIS CASE
On March 15, 1977, plaintiff-respondent filed its

Reply to Counterclaim (R.P. 19).

In that Reply, plaintiff-

respondent admitted entering into a contract with defendantappellant on February 7, 1976.

As a defense, plaintiff-

respondent alleged that defendant-appellant had breached
the contract and started an illicit business in competition
with plaintiff-respondent.
Nearly a year later on January 30, 1978, and after
all discovery had been completed and a pre-trial conference
had been held, plaintiff-respondent filed its Motion to
Amend Reply to Counterclaim (R.P. 71) and also its Amended
Reply to Counterclaim (R.P. 68-69).

The Motion was schedul-

ed to be heard on February 6, 1978, the morning of trial.
In the Amended Reply to Counterclaim plaintiff-respondent
denied entering into the contract.

10
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defense of fraud.

The trial court allowed the plaintiff-

respondent to amend its reply, after hearing the Motion in
chambers on February 6, 1978.
Such a motion should have been denied because of
the prejudice it created against the defendant-appellant.
To allow plaintiff-respondent to deny entering into the
contract and to allow it to raise an entirely new defense
on the day of trial was unconscionable.

It forced defendant-

appellant to enter the trial with no knowledge of what was
going to be presented by plaintiff-respondent.

The grant-

ing of plaintiff-respondent's Motion conflicted with one
of the major purposes of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure,
that of preventing surprise at trial.
In dealing with a similar problem, the Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals in Wirtz v. Savannah Bank & Trust
Co., 362 F.2d 857 (1966), denied such an amendment.

In

that case the court stated:
This motion on appeal in the guise of a
Rule lS(b) amendment seeks not only to
nullify an earlier admission but also to
assert a new defense not previously
pleaded. This cannot be done.
So also below, the trial court should not have allowed the
Amended Reply.

I t erred by doing so.

The trial court erred further, assuming that it
was proper to allow plaintiff-respondent to amend its Reply.

11
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If it was proper to allow the Amended Reply, its form was
improper.

As was stated in Gromacki v. Armour & Co., 76

F.Supp. 752 (W.D. Mo. 1948), "the essential elements of
fraud must be alleged and strictly proved."

Also Elster

v. Alexander, 75 F.R.D. 458 (N.D. Ga. 1977); In re National
Student Marketing Litigation, 413 F.Supp. 1156 (D.C. 1976).
The nine essential elements necessary to prove
fraud cited by this Court in Cheever v. Schrarrrrn, No. 15147
(March 16, 1978) were never alleged or proven by plaintiffrespondent.

Hence, in addition to improperly allowing the

Amended Reply, the trial court also allowed a pleading
averring fraud which failed to state the circumstances
constituting fraud with particularity as required by Rule
9(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and the above cited
cases.
Much of the evidence at trial dealt with the
alleged bad faith on the part of defendant-appellant.

In

neither the Reply to Counterclaim or the Amended Reply to
Counterclaim did plaintiff-respondent plead the affirmative
defense of good faith.

In Bunge Corp. v. Recker, 519 F.2d

449 (1974), the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals stated that
lack of good faith was akin to fraud and fell under Rule
8(c) which required it to be plead as an affirmative defense.
Since plaintiff-respondent failed to plead the
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issue of lack of good faith as an affirmative defense, it
should have been barred from using that defense inasmuch as
defendant-appellant was never put on notice of such a
defense.

CONCLUSION
It is respectfully submitted that, inasmuch as
there was substantial evidence of defendant-appellant's
good faith in the trial below and since the granting of
plaintiff-respondent's procedural requests on the day of
trial resulted in procedural unfairness to defendant-appellant,
the trial court's decision be reversed and the case remanded
for a new trial.
Respectfully submitted,

_,

A)_,_!4( 2, 71;~ ---

Wendell E. Bennett
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